Commentary for Avodah Zarah 124:1

Abaye says that the baraita does indeed mean that the workers are paid in sabbatical year produce. As to the objection that sabbatical year produce cannot be used to pay debts, Abaye says that they find a permitted way to give it to him. He draws an analogy with second tithe, which also may not be used to pay a debt. One cannot say to his fellow that if he helps bring the second tithe to Jerusalem, where it must be consumed, he will share it with him. But he can say that when they bring it to Jerusalem, they will eat and drink together. So too with regard to Sabbatical year produce, he can give it as a gift to his worker.

Rava says that the baraita does indeed mean that the wages of the donkey driver carrying Sabbatical year produce are holy like the produce itself. So why is the same not true for the wages of an average workman working with Sabbatical year produce? Because his wages are low. Donkey-drivers, on the other hand, have much higher wages, and therefore the rabbis penalized them.
There is one last question though—the mishnah we have been learning says that the rabbis penalized laborers who work with yayin nesekh. But we just said that since workers’ wages are low they are not penalized! The answer is that since the laws of yayin nesekh are more stringent, the rabbis penalized them as well.

Ordinary wine is as prohibited as yayin nesekh. The only difference is with regard to the laws of impurity, where wine known to be libated has a higher degree of impurity. The question is how do we deal with its status in a third category—the wages earned working with it?

As we can see, wages earned while working with ordinary wine is just as prohibited. The Talmud asks why R. Hisday told him to burn it and bury it. This is extraordinarily strict to make sure that people don’t accidentally come to use the wheat and that he not benefit from it as manure.

Why burn it and then bury it? Why not just bury it? This is what is done with the articles used in execution. As an aside it is interesting that the rabbis say that anything used to kill a human being can never again be used. It seems that there is some inherent disgrace, or perhaps even pollution accorded to these instruments. Not only should they not be glorified, essentially they must be destroyed.

When it comes to the instruments buried with the executed people, everyone will know that these items are prohibited and will not come to dig them up. But with the individual burying the wheat that he gained through renting out his ship, people might think he is burying it just to hide it because he stole it. Then they will come to steal it, which seems fitting since they suspect him of being a thief. To prevent this, it must be burned.
As an aside, it seems far more likely that people would come to try to steal the sword for it is more valuable. But rabbis never executed anyone so this source is not so “realistic.” Burying the sword is a symbolic act, not meant simply to prevent others from benefiting from it. On the other hand, the story of the wheat seems to be more realistic.

During the Sabbatical year the people of the house of R. Yannai would borrow produce from poor people (who can collect freely from the fields) before such produce needed to be removed from one’s home. They would pay the poor people back after the Sabbatical year, when produce can be sold. The question is—does this count as engaging in trade with Sabbatical year produce. R. Yohanan says it does not since by the time they compensated them, the original produce no longer existed. This seems to be a sort of legal fiction to circumvent the laws of the Sabbatical year, and also to benefit the poor.

The Talmud analogizes the above case with the prohibition of using an animal paid to a prostitute as a sacrifice (see Deuteronomy 23:19). As we shall see below, if he has sex with her and then gives her the animal, the animal may be used. By giving it to her after the sex, the animal is considered a gift and not payment.

The Talmud now analyzes the baraita. If he did not have intercourse with her, then obviously the animal is not prohibited. It was not a payment because nothing happened.

The second half of the baraita is equally difficult. If he didn’t give her anything then there is no animal to be prohibited.

The Talmud now seems to imply that the animal is basically always permitted, whether he gives it to her before intercourse or after. In tomorrow’s section the Talmud will analyze then how it can ever be prohibited.

If he gives her the animal and then has sex with her, this is payment for the sex. Why should the animal not be considered her wages and therefore prohibited? R. Elazar answers that first the man gives her the animal, then she offers it as a sacrifice and then he has sex with her. At the time when she offered it, it was permitted.